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The Development of Social Enterprise and Rise of 
Benefit Corporations: A Global Solution? 
 
Dina Dalessandro* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This note seeks to analyze the benefits, as well as shortfalls of social 
enterprises, alongside the development of state legislation supporting them.  
Social enterprises at their core are business ventures intentionally designed 
to affect a societal good or benefit.1  In doing so, social enterprises have 
transformed the landscape of the corporate law, as they arguably require an 
expansion of corporate governance.  In fact, the benefit corporation model 
implicates a profound change from the traditional form.  This is because in 
order to pursue a public good or benefit, these socially-driven companies 
may require directors and officers of the corporation to make business 
decisions which may diverge from the traditional goal of profit 
maximization.2 The benefit corporation, in turn, seeks to better align 
decision-making and allow corporate officers and directors to pursue profit-
maximization and  public good. Moreover, numerous case studies of 
successful companies, such as Patagonia, show that the two need not be 
mutually exclusive.3   
In an effort to support social enterprises many states have developed 
benefit corporation legislation.  Today, thirty-four states have passed such 
statutes.4  As such, the social enterprise movement and benefit 
corporations, as their vehicle, can pose a valuable solution to many of the 
problems that traditional corporations have posed to society.  Notably, the 
mounting criticism of corporate greed has provided support for the 
development of social enterprise.  Through analysis of this new business 
model, it will become clear that benefit corporations can provide a potential 
solution to many important global problems, such as promoting sustainable 
 
 * J.D. Candidate at the University of California Hastings, Class of 2019. 
 1. Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 921 (2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See generally Haskell J. Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers & Acquisitions with Benefit 
Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS L.J. 485 (2013). 
 4. State By State Status of Legislation, THE BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/policy 
makers/state-by-state-status [perma.cc/V8Y4-MM5Q]. 
 Summer 2019 SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 295 
development and environmental protection.  The continued growth of the 
social enterprise movement can be supported by the creation of the benefit 
corporation statues.  However, to advance movement, as a whole, more 
support is needed from the bottom-up.  Garnering greater demand from the 
market, will require the government and even Wall Street to accept this 
new corporate form and the social impact business model.  In turn, social 
enterprises may seek to garner greater market support and investment, and 
perhaps even government funding in the form of tax breaks, to guarantee 
their growth and ultimately, their success.  With this monetary and societal 
investment, then, the benefit corporation may become an effective solution 
to the problematic aspects that the traditional corporate model has posed. 
 
II. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE DEFINED 
 
The Social Enterprise Alliance, an organization which provides a 
platform for the social enterprise movement,5 defines social enterprises as 
“organizations that address a basic unmet need or solve a social or 
environmental problem through a market-drive approach.”6  Ultimately, 
social enterprises are “triple-bottom-line” organizations which seek to 
balance profit, social impact, and environmental sustainability.7  Notably, a 
social enterprise can be both a non-profit or a traditional corporation, but 
this paper will be focused solely on the corporate model.  Social enterprises 
allow for a company to integrate a social impact or benefit into its business 
operations.8  In doing so, they have attempted to address a variety of social 
issues from poverty to maintaining environmental resources.  Some well-
known social enterprises include: Grameen Bank, which makes small loans 
for small business development; Warby Parker, which makes a contribution 
to non-profit Vision Spring for every pair sold; and Terra Cycle, which 
recycles packaging and consumer waste into new products, keeping it out 
of landfills.9  Indeed, the growth of social enterprise in the past ten years is 
a reflection on the need and demand for greater social responsibility and 
sustainability in business practices. 
 
 
 5. About SEA, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://socialenterprise.us/about/what-we-do/ 
[perma.cc/7FSJ-HLLG]. 
 6. What is Social Enterprise?, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, 
https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enterprise/ [perma.cc/MKP3-KDMF]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
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III. THE RISE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
 
Alongside the development of social enterprise has been the public 
outcry against the traditional corporate model and the accumulation of 
wealth in only a small portion of the population.  The frustration of the 
American public can be seen in the uprising of socially liberal platforms, as 
seen in Bernie Sanders’ 2016 campaign for President.  Sanders ran on the 
platform that millions of Americans are working longer hours for lower 
wages, while the wealthy top one percent and largest corporations are 
growing and getting richer.10  Part of this, Sanders claims, is the way 
corporations are designed and the way they function to help and benefit 
only the shareholders and the top executives.11 
Notably, the traditional corporate model is designed with the primary 
goal of shareholder wealth maximization.  In more recent years, however, 
corporations have been criticized by both the public and their own 
shareholders for misusing corporate funds, high executive compensation, 
and unsustainable business practices.  This criticism has fueled a global 
movement against social inequality and the destruction of our global 
environment and nature resources, and ultimately pushed for better 
corporate oversight. 
Moreover, the 2008 economic crisis serves as evidence of the dangers 
of the comingling between Wall Street and large multinational corporations 
and the government.  The 2008 crash is said to be the result of capitalistic 
corporate greed, the growth of privatization, and the lack of government 
regulation.12  Ultimately, the 2008 economic crisis led to a global protest of 
the corporate form and the growing culture of corporate greed.13  A 
movement that quickly spread globally began in the United States and 
Canada in 2011, and was coined “Occupy Wall Street,” transformed into a 
protest against the role of Wall Street in creating the economic collapse.  
The “Occupy” movement sought to fight back against the richest one 
 
 10. Bernie Sanders, The Corporate Greed Must End, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/corporate-greed-must-end_b_7653442.html 
[perma.cc/BY2E-LSSG]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Charles Ferguson, The Inside Job, (2010), http://www.sonyclassics.com/insidejob/site/#/ 
synopsis [perma.cc/6QMT-XB4B]. 
 13. Davis Randall, Davis & Mark Thomas, , Across the World, the indigent rise up against 
corporate greed, THE INDEPENDENT (Oct. 15, 2011), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/across-the-world-the-indignant-rise-up-against-
corporate-greed-and-cuts-2371357.html [perma.cc/WD3Q-Y3P6]; Edith Honan and Edward 
McAllister, Thousands protest banks, corporate greed in US marches, REUTERS (Oct. 14, 2011), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wallstreet-protests/thousands-protest-banks-corporate-greed-in-
u-s-marches-idUSTRE79A41E20111015 [perma.cc/92QA-XKFA]. 
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percent of people, which are “writing the rules of unfair global economy.”14  
The movement sustained itself as an effort to fight against the power of 
major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process.15  
Notably, it spread across Asia, Europe, and the Middle-east and led to 
protests in 1,500 cities across the world, fully exposing the lack of trust and 
confidence of the public in the democratic process and in capitalism on a 
global scale.16 
The Edelman Trust Barometer, a yearly trust and credibility survey, 
which aims to measure the populations trust in business, government, 
NGOs and media on a global scale, reveals that “trust is in crisis around the 
world,” in its most recent study.17  The report indicates that a majority of 
respondents believe that the overall system is not working for them, stating 
that people’s societal and economic concerns, including globalization, the 
pace of innovation and eroding social values, turn into fears, spurring the 
rise of populist actions now playing out in several Western-style 
democracies.18  They claim that in order rebuild trust and faith in the 
system, institutions must step outside of their traditional roles and work 
toward a new, more integrated operating model that puts people at the 
center of everything they do.19  This where social enterprise comes into 
play. 
Likewise, commentators have noted that social enterprises may 
provide a solution to many of the inequalities that capitalism has created.  
Notably, Majorie Kelly, author of the book The Divine Right of Capital,20 
argues many of the problems created by corporate America, such as wealth 
inequality and pollution can be traced to corporate law.21  Conventional 
corporate structures and the corporate model itself require operation solely 
in the interest of their owners, an idea known as “shareholder primacy”, the 
theory that shareholder interest should be assigned priority to all other 
corporate stakeholders.  Social enterprises challenge the shareholder 
primacy norm by requiring corporate boards to think about another 
constituency: the public.  The development of constituency statutes and 
 
 14. OCCUPY WALL STREET (Aug. 27, 2016), http://occupywallst.org/about/ [perma.cc/3PE6-
57RN]. 
 15. See id. 
 16. OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 14. 
 17. EDELMAN TRUST, Global Results, (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.edelman.com/global-results/ 
[perma.cc/YJN6-FYAS]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See generally KELLY MAJORIE, THE DIVINE RIGHT TO CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE 
CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY (Berret-Koehler Publishers, 2001). 
 21. Mark Gunther, Will Wall Street Embrace B Corps, B THE CHANGE (Mar. 31, 2017), https:// 
bthechange.com/will-wall-street-embrace-b-corps-5df5c91c4f4a [perma.cc/6VPD-A3LT]. 
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public benefit corporation statues has allowed corporations and directors to 
do more than just seek profits and thus has eliminated the profit 
maximization norm.  Moreover, the statutes require a business to pursue 
profits in a sustainable way, for the environment and society at large.  
Therefore, this rise of social enterprises may provide a solution to the 
downfalls and problems created by the traditional corporate model. 
IV.  DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION 
A.  THE TRADITIONAL CORPORATE MODEL 
Proponents of social enterprise and benefit corporation legislation 
have focused on landmark cases Dodge v. Ford and eBay v. Newmark,22 as 
evidence of why new corporate statutes should exist.  The notion that 
corporations have a purpose beyond creating financial gain for its 
shareholders is remarkably novel.  The Court in Dodge v. Ford,23 
articulated that “a business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of stockholders.”24  For the past hundred years, 
courts diligently followed this proposition.  The Michigan Supreme Court 
famously ordered Ford to make a cash distribution to its shareholders 
despite his claim that he wished to use the excess capital in the corporation 
to benefit society.25  Dodge famously involved a minority shareholder suit 
by the Dodge brothers, who claimed Ford failed to maximize shareholder 
value.26  The fact that Ford stated he wanted to maximize something other 
than profit maximization made it impossible for the court to afford him the 
traditional business judgment deference accorded to directors. 27 
In the more recent eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 28 the 
Delaware Court reaffirmed the primacy of wealth maximization.29   The 
case involved a dispute between Craig Newmark and James Buckmaster, 
the majority shareholders and directors of Craigslist, and eBay.30  Although 
technically a for-profit corporation, Craigslist sought to operate its business 
 
 22. Murray, supra note 3, at 510. 
 23. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 24. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 684; see also Elizabeth K. Babson & William H. 
Clark, How Benefit Corporations are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825 (2012). 
 25. Murray, supra note 3, at 493. 
 26. Michael Thomas, Why Kickstarter Decided to Radically Change its Business Model, FAST 
COMPANY (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3068547/why-kickstarter-decided-to-radica 
lly-transform-its-business-model [perma.cc/8B36-AUHV]. 
 27. Leo E. Strine, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek 
Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147–48 (2012). 
 28. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 29. Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 827–28; see also Murray, supra note 3, at 491–93. 
 30. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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largely as a community service, allowing users to post classified 
advertisements free of charge, thus profit-maximizing was not the primary 
goal.31  The dispute arose when it became clear that eBay hoped to acquire 
Craigslist as a subsidiary.  Newmark and Buckmaster opposed the 
monetization of the site, preferring to keep to its unique culture and 
community service roots, thus adopted a rights plan as a defensive measure.32  
In response, eBay sued, alleging that Newmark and Buckmaster breached their 
duties as majority shareholders.33  The Court evaluated whether Newmark and 
Buckmaster’s claim that eBay’s takeover would threaten the values, culture 
and business model of Craigslist was a viable reason to prevent the takeover.34  
Ultimately the Court found that Craigslist was not warranted to put a defensive 
mechanism in place to prevent the takeover and that doing so would violate the 
shareholder’s wealth maximization, which is the primacy of a fiduciary’s 
duties.  Subsequently, eBay has been cited as reason why directors need a 
mechanism to support company goals which may fall outside the profit-
maximization norm.  As such, benefit corporation legislation was created 
largely in response to the eBay problem and with the justification that it can 
create protection for corporation’s in the event of a takeover. 
Unilever’s takeover of Ben & Jerry’s is yet another justification for 
why companies need benefit corporation statutes.35  Ben & Jerry’s 
Homemade, Inc. was a for-profit corporation that pursued a “double bottom 
line,” seeking to advance progressive social goals, while at the same 
yielding financial returns for investors.36  It advanced its social mission in 
many ways: committing 7.5% of its profits to a charitable foundation; 
conducting in-store voter registration; and buying ingredients from 
suppliers who employed disadvantaged populations.”37  However in 2000 
Ben & Jerry’s was acquired by Unilever, a large multi-national company 
which was only focused on profit maximization and abandoned the many 
social initiatives Ben & Jerry’s had once pursued.38  In this way, Ben & 
Jerry’s is “a case study for the perils of maintaining a social mission in a 
publicly-traded corporate form.”39  In fact, the proponents of benefit 
corporation legislation firmly believe that social enterprises require the 
support of a statute in order to successfully pursue both its social motive or 
 
 31. Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 827–28. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1. 
 35. Murray, supra note 3, at 503-04. 
 36. Robert Katz & Antony Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a 
Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 212 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 211. 
 38. Id. at 211–12. 
 39. Id. at 212. 
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public benefit and to produce a profit. 
B.  DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUENCY STATUTES 
Constituency statutes allow directors to consider the constituencies of 
groups other than shareholders.  Arguably, constituency statutes were 
developed as a defensive mechanism for companies that were subject to 
hostile takeovers and to provide protection to a target company’s board, by 
giving them the discretion to reject a hostile takeover based on its 
consideration of constituencies other than shareholders.40  Thus, the 
directors of these businesses are explicitly given the ability to consider 
people other than their shareholders.  This allowed businesses pursing a 
social mission the tools to do so, without being sued.  While directors of 
mission-driven companies could now consider the interest of various 
constituencies, not all states adopted these statutes.  Most notably, 
Delaware did not.  The lack of case law and the fact that corporate law was 
still dominated by Delaware, led to little success in the interpretation and 
use of these statutes.41  Furthermore, the statues are only permissive, and 
while they give directors the option to consider other constituencies, there 
is no requirement.42  While the constituency statutes provided for a shift in 
corporate law, allowing the consideration of issues outside of shareholder 
wealth maximization, they required no commitment on behalf of directors, 
nor did they require accountability.43 
C.  B LAB AND THE B CORP 
The new millennium fostered a great deal of entrepreneurialism for 
social purpose.  In 2006, the nonprofit organization, “B Lab,” established a 
way to change the business world.44  B Lab sought to provide 
accountability and oversight for businesses that wished to pursue a public 
benefit.45  A for-profit corporation could show its commitment to social 
motive by becoming a registered “B Corp,” registering and submitting to 
monitoring by B Lab. B Lab monitors social enterprises by requiring them 
to maintain standards for social and environmental performance, 
accountability and transparency; if the standards are met, then B Lab will 
 
 40. Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 829. 
 41. Id. at 831. 
 42. Id. at 832. 
 43. Benefit Corporation, Benefit Corporations are Necessary, http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/ 
benefit-corporations-are-necessary [perma.cc/BG5C-PR4M]. 
 44. B Lab, About B Lab, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab [perma.cc/ 
P96E-Z6WW]. 
 45. Id. 
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offer its certification status.46 
B Lab was founded by the former founders and executives of footwear 
brand, AND1, Bart Houlahan and Andrew Kassoy, after they watched their 
company deteriorate in the shadows of Nike.47  While AND1 reached 
revenue of $250 million in 2001,  they were ultimately forced to sell the 
company in 2006.48  Before the sale, they had given their employees 
generous parental leave benefits and equity in the company; donated five 
percent of their profits to charity, and they enforced strict rules on their 
overseas suppliers to ensure fair wages and safety.49  As soon as they lost 
control of the company, all of that was stripped away.  With the 
establishment of B Lab, their mission was to help usher in a new era of 
corporate governance where companies did right by shareholders and the 
world around them simultaneously.50  As of this publication, there are 2,778 
registered B Corps across 150 industries, which B Lab monitors, making 
this innovation a huge success for the founders.  
However, many propositioned that these new companies designed and 
motivated by a social purpose could not be sustained on the traditional 
corporate statutes and then simply certified to be effective.  Moreover, the 
traditional corporate model arguably did not have the necessary oversight 
and regulatory mechanism to allow social enterprises to be both successful 
and effective,51 even with help from B Lab. 
As such, a community of academics, entrepreneurs, and lawyers, 
urged for more robust monitoring and governance in the creation and 
maintenance of social enterprises. 
 
It is against the paradigm of shareholder primacy that benefit 
corporations have been drafted. These statues address not only 
the need for a new corporate form, but also respond to the 
demand from the market place for a corporate form that meets 
the needs and expectation of increasingly socially and 
environmentally conscious consumers, investors, and 
entrepreneurs.52 
The push for a new and unique variation of the traditional corporation 
 
 46. Jonathon Storper, What’s the Difference Between a B Corp and a Benefit Corporation, 
CONSCIOUS COMPANY MEDIA (Apr. 4, 2015), https://consciouscompanymedia.com/sustainable-
business/whats-the-difference-between-a-b-corp-and-a-benefit-corporation. [perma.cc/L9NS-9U9P]. 
 47. See Thomas, supra note 26. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally Ball, supra note 1. 
 52. Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 838. 
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led to the development of the unique benefit corporation.  The B Lab 
founders played a large role in developing legislation and lobbying states to 
pass new statutes.  Jonathon Storper, a corporate attorney in the Bay Area’s 
office of Hanson Bridgett, was one of the initial drafters of California’s 
benefit corporation legislation.53  Storper expressed the challenges he faced 
with getting the law passed in California, as the first effort was vetoed by 
then Governor Schwarzenegger.54  Storper worked with two other 
California corporate attorneys and colleagues, John Montgomery and 
Donald Simon, as well as B Lab to lobby politicians and develop what they 
called a social purpose bill, which would in effect allow corporations to 
pursue a mission outside of the typical profit-maximization goals of 
traditional corporations.55  Part of the battle, Storper explained, included 
getting around conservative business interests who feared that such 
legislation would impose social and environmental obligations on them.56  
Even more, Storper explained that people fear change and this new type of 
statute was daunting to both the business and legal world.57  In fact, many 
lawyers, scholars and businesses were hesitant to take on this new 
corporate form. 
Some of the initial criticism stemmed from the fact that the legislation 
created an entirely new type of corporation, while the traditional model had 
been widely accepted for the past hundred years.  Well-respected Chief 
Justice Strine, of the Delaware Supreme Court, has suggested that the 
benefit corporation is really modest in the evolution of the corporate 
model.58  Even going so far to state that “those who believe that corporate 
law must make stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance 
are simply wrong and have misread the precedent.”59 
Indeed, since its formation, the benefit corporation has met a great 
deal criticism and reluctance. However, many initial fears and criticisms 
subsided by the overall successes that these statutes provided. In fact, 
supporters of the benefit corporation argue that it has been effective 
because it provides for reduced director liability, expanded stockholder 
rights, an advantage in attracting and retaining talent, increased access to 
certain private investment capital, increased attractiveness to retail 
investors, and mission protection, to name a few.60  
 
 53.  In-person interview with Jonathon Storper, Law Partner, Hanson Bridgett (Nov. 6, 2017). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Gunther, supra note 21. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Leo E. Strine, Making it Easier for Directors To “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 235, 242 (2014). 
 59. Id. 
 60. FAQ, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/faq [perma.cc/X2MU-ZWLH]. 
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D. BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES 
The introduction the benefit corporation statute created a platform that 
allowed social entrepreneurs to create a business that pursued both profit 
and a social or environmental purpose. Most statutes actually require that 
the corporation must list a stated purpose in its charter and be designed 
provide a “public benefit.”61  While the statutes do tend to differ from state 
to state, they have three common requirements: (1) a stated public purpose; 
(2) corporate governance scheme, (3) transparency and accountability 
enforcement.62 
Maryland was the first state to pass such a statute in 2010.63 California 
pioneered its own legislation for the benefit corporation in 2011 and 
Delaware passed its own version in 2013.64  As noted, thirty-four states 
passed benefit corporation statutes  and six are “working on it”.65  A few 
examples of well-known benefit corporations include Method, Kickstarter, 
Plum Organics, King Arthur Flour, Patagonia, Solberg Manufacturing, 
Laureate Education and Altschool.66 
As mentioned, the benefit corporation model explicitly creates an 
established general and specific public benefit.67  In California, the general 
public purpose is defined as creating a material positive impact on society 
and the environment as a whole, but the statute does not require a benefit 
corporation to list a “specific purpose.”68  In Delaware, the statue defines 
general public purpose as producing a positive effect or reducing a negative 
effect on one or more shareholders.69  These requirements ensure that the 
corporation is not only focused toward a narrow cause or interest, but also 
on being a good corporate citizen.70  Since a benefit corporation must have 
a specific purpose serving the public benefit, it requires some form of 
accountability mechanism.  Accordingly, directors of benefit corporations 
will balance the impact of their decisions not only on its corporate 
shareholders but also on their stakeholders, which can even include the 
general public or the environment at large.71  As such, a common criticism 
 
 61. Jonathon Storper, Being a Public Benefit Corporation in California, Delaware, LAW 360 
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/980865 [https://perma.cc/R59M-A5EV]. 
 62. See Jeremy Chen, What is a California Benefit Corporation, http://jeremychenlaw.com/what-
is-a-california-benefit-corporation/ [perma.cc/JW34-UW8B]. 
 63. FAQ, supra note 60. 
 64. Storper, supra note 61. 
 65. State By State, supra note 4. 
 66. FAQ. supra note 60. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Storper, supra note 61. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Strine, supra note 58, at 244. 
 71. FAQ, supra note 60. 
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of the benefit corporation is that the decision-making places a large burden 
on directors.   
In a traditional corporation directors must perform their duties in good 
faith and in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.72  This 
is typically referred to as the duty of loyalty.  Directors of a benefit 
corporation not only have that continued obligation, but now they must also 
consider the stakeholder interests of employees and customers, as well as 
pursue the mission of the corporation faithfully.73 To carry out the missions 
of the a social enterprise, a benefit corporation statute will feature built-in 
measures for accountability and transparency.74  In most states, this requires 
a corporation to create and publish an annual benefit reports that assesses 
their overall social impact and performance against a third-party standard.75  
Notably, these reports do not need to be certified or audited by a third 
party, such as B Lab.  However, the reporting mechanism is vital to the 
structure of benefit corporations because there is no requirement that they 
be independently monitored or certified by a third party, unless stated in 
their charter.76  The requirement to measure the corporation’s performance 
by determining an overall environmental or social impact in each year is 
certainly new for corporations.77  Arguably, this oversight is necessary to 
ensure that directors are keep aligned with the designated mission of the 
corporation.78 
As noted, both the California and Delaware statutes require a 
corporation to produce an annual report to their shareholders.  Though, the 
standards for the report do differ.  In California, the report must detail how 
the board selected the third-party standard and how the corporation pursued 
its general and/or specific public benefit for the year, including what ways 
it failed.79  Delaware corporations must provide shareholders with an 
overall statement of the objectives and standards adopted by the board and 
an assessment of its success during the year.80  The California statute 
requires that the annual report is sent to its shareholders within 120 days 
following the end of the fiscal year and to post the report on its website.81  
However, Delaware does not impose a requirement that the report must be 
 
 72. Chen, supra note 62. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Strine, supra note 58, at 244. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Storper, supra note 61. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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provided to the public or posted on the website.82  While both statutes 
create a mechanism for oversight, it is clear that California’s guidelines are 
much tougher, while Delaware’s are more elusive and are criticized as not 
imposing strict enough guidelines on these corporations. 
 
V.  AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO TRADITIONAL 
CORPORATIONS? 
 
Becoming a benefit corporation is fairly simple.  If you are a new 
business, you can simply incorporate as a benefit corporation in any state 
where such legislation has been passed.  The procedure for incorporation 
will be roughly the same as for a traditional corporation.83  If you have an 
existing company, you can elect to become a benefit corporation by 
amending your governing documents, with a two-thirds super-majority of 
all shareholders. 84 
A. GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS SOLVED? 
In a benefit corporation, shareholders retain the same protections that 
they have in a traditional corporate model.85  This includes electing the 
directors, voting on major corporate transactions, bringing lawsuits, and 
demanding to review the company’s books and records.86  Notably, 
shareholders of a benefit corporation retain the right to bring a derivative 
suit for breach of fiduciary duty.87  In addition, shareholders of benefit 
corporations have a private right of action allowing them to enforce the 
mission of the corporation.88  A public benefit enforcement proceeding can 
be brought by a shareholder, director, or group owning five percent or more 
in corporate equity, for a violation of director or officer duties or for failure 
to uphold the mission of the corporation.89  However, damages are limited 
to injunctive relief, and monetary damages are not available.90 
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Additionally, a director’s basic duties in a benefit corporation are the 
same as those for a general corporation; a director of a benefit corporation 
has the formal fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  To satisfy the duty of 
care, a director must become fully informed.  In a benefit corporation this 
means “considering the impact of decisions on a broad array of the 
corporation’s stakeholders, rather than just the interests of its 
shareholders.”91  The duty of loyalty is same standard for both benefit and 
traditional corporations such that a director must not put his or her own 
interests before the interests of the corporation.92 
Critics argue that even though the director’s duties do not change, they 
do expand—in that they require the director to pursue both profit and the 
corporation’s mission.  In this way, the discretion of the directors is rather 
broad because it does not give guidance on implementing the dual motives 
of these corporations.93  More simply, the statutes do not explain how to 
properly balance profit maximization and social benefit, and moreover 
what to do when these two things conflict. 
In contrast, some argue that the duties of a director are actually more 
constrained in a benefit corporation than they are in a traditional 
corporation due to the business judgment rule.  In ordinary course, 
decisions made by a corporation’s directors are protected by the business 
judgment rule, under which courts will not second-guess operating 
decisions made by directors.94  Conceptually, this requires directors to be 
more careful when making business decisions because they are subject to 
the discretion of the statutes.95  This legal protection provides directors with 
the flexibility to balance both financial and non-financial interests when 
making decisions.  Since the directors are afforded a broad level of 
discretion, shareholders can keep this in check with their maintained 
powers to sue for breach of care or loyalty.96 
B. ABANDONING DUTIES? 
Critically, the public benefit corporation does not vitiate any profit-
maximization duty, nor does it relax the traditional protections that 
traditional corporate law provides to investors.97  But, it does allow a shift 
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of power within the stockholder base, allowing the right to sue when a 
director strays from profit maximization or from the corporation’s mission.  
Of course, within the benefit corporation model, a director may consider 
the interests of more than just the shareholders, shifting away from the 
traditional profit-maximization norm established in Revlon. Under Revlon, 
the board must sell to the highest bidder, maximizing the potential profit to 
shareholders. 98   The Delaware Supreme Court famously held that 
“regardless of its mission, a corporation may not consider social and 
environmental factors in a change of control” and the “concern for non-
stockholder interests is inappropriate” in the sale context.99   However, with 
the establishment of benefit corporations, this duty arguably may not apply.  
This is due to the fact that under benefit corporation statutes directors have 
broader distraction to make decisions.100  This, in turn, gives more power to 
directors who believe that a less profitable, but more socially responsible 
path should be taken, even in the context of a merger or acquisition.101  
Although it is still unclear how courts will evaluate a director’s decisions in 
the context of a sale or merger of the company, since the law is so new in 
this area and there are no case-studies as of yet.  
C. PROTECTING THE MISSION 
The shift in the shareholder paradigm in a benefit corporation has a 
substantial impact on the role of directors, as mentioned above.  Arguably 
the strongest aspect of the benefit corporation statutes is that they drive the 
mission of the corporation by providing a more flexible platform designed 
for pursuing both profit-seeking and for creating a social benefit.102  In this 
way, the benefit corporation alleviates fears of eBay103 repeating itself by 
explicitly stating that the purpose of the benefit corporation is not 
shareholder wealth maximization but a “general public benefit.”104  This is 
further enabled by the enhanced discretion of the board. Accordingly, the 
benefit corporation gives entrepreneurs and investors a more suitable 
option to achieve their objectives.105 
 One of the strongest arguments in support of the benefit corporation is 
the maintenance of a mission.106  This is what is commonly referred to as 
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“mission stickiness,” a term that encompasses the idea that benefit 
corporations are designed to reduce the amount and/or probability of any 
mission-drift.107  “This mission stickiness is currently created in two ways: 
the super majority vote and the benefit enforcement proceeding.”108  As 
noted, most benefit corporation statutes require an affirmative vote of at 
least two-thirds of the shareholders to adopt or terminate benefit 
corporation status.109  Moreover, a benefit enforcement proceeding can 
provide a way for shareholders to potentially prevent a transaction that 
strays from the benefit corporation’s mission.110  As such, the benefit 
corporation statutes can provide additional protection for risk-averse 
managers and serve as a valuable warning device to possible acquirers.111 
Arguably then, these statues could serve to protect benefit corporations 
from potential bidders who would destroy the company’s mission, which 
was the pertinent issue in the aforementioned Revlon. 
i. A Success Story: Patagonia 
Since its inception in 1973, Patagonia has pursued its mission to build 
the best product, to cause no unnecessary harm, and to use business to 
inspire and implement solutions to the environmental crisis.112  In these 
ways, Patagonia has established a mission-seeking approach to benefit both 
the society and environment, even before the benefit corporation existed. 
 Patagonia became one of the first benefit corporations in California in 
2012 after the statute was enacted and is now a premiere example for the 
movement.113  Patagonia has numerous social and environmental initiatives, 
including providing health care to part-time workers, providing flexible 
working schedules, enforcing a code of conduct on all primary suppliers, 
using primarily environmentally preferred materials, and donating one 
percent of sales to environmental NGOs.114  Patagonia’s specific benefit 
purpose commitments include contributing one percent of annual net 
revenues to nonprofit charitable organizations that promote environmental 
conservation and sustainability, to build the best product and conduct 
operations causing no unnecessary harm, sharing best practices with other 
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companies, transparency, and providing a supportive work environment.115  
Patagonia posts its performance report for each year on its website, 
available to the general public.116 
Patagonia’s founder Yvon Chouinard supported the benefit 
corporation movement since the beginning.  While Patagonia continues to 
be a privately held corporation, Chouinard, recognizes that “benefit 
corporation legislation creates the legal framework to enable mission-
driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven through succession, 
capital raises and even change in ownership.117  Chouinard, now nearly 
eighty years old, relies on the benefit corporation model to keep his 
company intact for years to come.118  The benefit corporation movement 
provides a “clear and dependable path for business to be an agent of 
positive change”, states Patagonia CEO Rose Marciano.119  In this way, the 
statutes create the legal framework to enable mission-driven companies like 
Patagonia to stay mission-driven through succession, capital raises, and 
even changes in ownership, by institutionalizing the values, culture, 
processes, and high standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs.120 
Notably, in 2015 Patagonia’s sales reached a peak of $750 million,121 
showing that benefit corporations can be both sustainable and profitable.  
Accordingly, the benefit corporation allows “a company to act purposefully 
at all stages of decision-making, balancing transparency with the need to 
achieve financial gain, while also taking deliberate action to create 
additional benefits for multiple stakeholders” and eliminating the “false 
choice between making money and doing the right thing.”122 
ii.  Improvement in the Statute 
While the benefit corporation statutes contain preemptory measures to 
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prevent mission-shift, however many argue that more can be done, 
especially to protect a benefit corporation in the event it goes public.  As 
mentioned above, Patagonia continues to be a privately held corporation, 
but academic Haskell Murray envisions a potential situation where 
Patagonia would go public and would require greater protection.123 
Murray argues that “mission stickiness could be improved by 
amending current benefit corporation statutes and giving the statutes some 
teeth by requiring a floor for corporate charitable giving and a partial asset 
lock.”124  The first proposal involves imposing a mandatory floor for 
corporate charitable giving.125  Notably, this is something that Patagonia 
already does, giving one percent of their annual revenues to a charitable 
organization of their choosing.  
Murray’s other proposal is a partial asset lock for benefit corporations 
to prevent companies from raising capital for a benefit corporation by 
promoting themselves as a “good” company and then quickly selling to the 
highest bidder.126 Arguably, the statutes could impose a lock on some 
percentage of the benefit corporations assets so that this percentage of the 
assets are guaranteed to be left behind, even if the corporation is bought 
and has its benefit corporation status terminated. In these ways, the 
corporate giving floor and the partial asset lock would ensure that the 
benefit corporation’s mission was not completely abandoned.127  To date, 
neither of these suggestions have been enacted in already existing benefit 
corporation statutes, but they are potential food for thought, as the 
movement continues to transform.   
Moreover, they may be important in the analysis of the future of the 
benefit corporation as companies begin to go public.  Going public, refers 
to the process of selling shares that were formerly privately owned to 
investors for the first time.  Although going public may be advantageous 
for many benefit corporations to attract more capital and investment, it may 
also create problems for maintaining the mission.  For instance, “going 
public may create pressure to realize short-term profits to maintain the 
company’s stock price, causing the business to drift from its social 
mission.”128  To date we have few examples of benefit corporations going 
public and thus little to test the potential mission drift issue. 
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VI.  THE FUTURE OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
 
As discussed above, incorporating as a benefit company is a tool to 
ensure the protection of the corporation’s mission.  Ultimately, becoming a 
benefit corporation can “protect [the] mission through capital raises and 
leadership changes, creates more flexibility when evaluating potential sale 
and liquidity options, and prepares businesses to lead a mission-driven life 
post-IPO.”129  It was vital for Delaware to adopt the benefit corporation 
statute because it is the “domicile for a majority of American public 
companies and the preferred domicile for companies seeking to go 
public.”130  “The best pathway forward for benefit corporations that wish to 
go public is arguably “through the use of the Delaware statute, because of 
Delaware’s acceptance among institutional investors corporate managers, 
and the intermediaries who raise capital.”131  
 Only one benefit corporation has gone public to date, so it is unclear 
what the fate for these corporations will be on as public companies and 
ultimately if they will be accepted by Wall Street.  However, to be a viable 
replacement to the traditional corporate model, the benefit corporation 
statute may need to prove that it can be sustained on Wall Street.   
 Some commentators claim the reason why more companies have not 
gone public is due to investors’ hesitancy, since the focus is not solely on 
shareholder wealth maximization.132  Thus, one of the major hurdles is 
raising capital and becoming more attractive to investors.  One way to do 
this may be by increasing market awareness and demand for the benefit 
corporation. 
A.  GOING PUBLIC? 
In 2017, Laureate Education became the first public benefit 
corporation to go public, notably it is also a certified B Corp.133  Laureate is 
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the world’s largest for-profit operator of online and campus-based higher 
education.  It owns, controls and manages eighty-eight institutions, serving 
one million students across 25 countries.134  It grew fairly rapidly and in 
2014 its revenues exceeded $4.4 billion.135  It’s a 16-year-old company, but 
it announced its new charter as a Delaware Benefit Corporation in 2015.136  
Laureate and its shareholders, have “rejected the market paradigm of 
‘shareholder primacy’ by going public as a new type of corporate entity 
specifically designed to treat customers, employees and communities as the 
shareholders’ partners, rather than as interests to be managed for maximum 
financial gain.”137  Before going public, Laureate’s initial investors 
included groups such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), one of the 
world’s largest private equity firms, Point 72, another venture capital giant, 
and International Finance Corp., a private-sector arm of the World Bank.138  
Laureate CEO and founder, Doug Becker, made it clear that his company’s 
only goal will not be making a profit, and that the company seeks to 
“balance the needs of stockholders with the needs of students, employees 
and communities in which we operate.”139  Laureate raised $490 million 
from investors in its initial public offering (“IPO”).140  The Laureate IPO is 
considered to be a roadmap for individual and institutional investors who 
want to invest capital in businesses that generate strong returns and make 
valuable contributions to society at large. 
Before Laureate Education, Etsy, a certified B Corp, went public in 
2015, its IPO valuing the company at $3.38 billion.141  Etsy’s mission is 
“commitment to having a positive social, economic and environmental 
impact.”142  While Etsy has maintained its B Corp status, which it retained 
in 2012, it has not yet incorporated as a benefit corporation. But, it may 
need to in order to maintain its B Corp status.  B Lab requires companies 
incorporated in states with benefit corporation laws to comply with their 
home states’ standards to maintain their B Corp status; a company has four 
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years from the date the legislation is passed to comply with state law or risk 
losing B Corp certification.143  Etsy is incorporated in Delaware, where the 
benefit corporation statute passed in 2013, but with an amended statute 
released in 2015, B Lab is allowing Etsy until August of 2019 to re-
incorporate, without losing its B Corp certification status.144 
Nevertheless, Etsy has shown that it is possible for a company that 
values commitments beyond shareholder maximization to be a publicly 
traded company.145  Unfortunately, Etsy did not have a great first year after 
going public; the share price dropped from $35.74 a share at its IPO to 
$8.32 a share, nearly eighty percent,146 but is trading at over $60 a share as 
of 2019.  However, failing to incorporate as a benefit corporation could put 
Etsy at risk for potential mission-drift and susceptible to being purchased 
by a hostile bidder.  Furthermore, as a public company, Etsy faces greater 
scrutiny from investors on how much it prioritizes its “noble pursuits over 
its bottom line.”147 
It is too early to say what the future for Laureate Education or Etsy 
will be as public companies.  While they have shown that it is possible to 
maintain a mission and a profit and to balance multiple constituencies 
including shareholders, their success cannot be applauded yet.  
Accordingly, lawyers, entrepreneurs and investors will be watching to see 
whether Wall Street will come to embrace other publicly traded companies 
with a social benefit mandate.148 
B. INCREASED INVESTMENT 
One of the major gaps to fill is funding for these companies, and more 
specially impact investing, sometimes referred to Socially Responsible 
Investing (“SRI”).  “Impact investments are those made to companies, 
organizations, and funds with the intention to generate social and 
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environmental impact alongside a financial return.”149  Like the premise 
behind the social enterprise movement, it “challenges the long-held views 
that social and environmental issues should be addressed only by 
philanthropic donations, and that market investments should focus 
exclusively on achieving financial returns.”150  A 2010 report by J.P. 
Morgan, titled “Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class”, states that 
impact investing has gained traction among a wide range of investors, 
including large-scale financial institutions, pension funds, family offices, 
private wealth mangers, foundations, individuals, commercial banks, and 
development finance institutions.151  The report estimates the size of this 
market opportunity in impact investments to be between $400 billion and 
$1 trillion.152  This estimate includes investment opportunities in emerging 
markets across five sectors: housing, rural water delivery, maternal health, 
primary education, and services.153  Likewise, the 2016 Report on US 
Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investment Trends shows a thirty-
three percent increase in the preceding two years, and a fourteen-fold 
increase since 1995.154  In fact, from 2012 to 2014, the number of U.S. 
investment funds that incorporated environmental, governmental or social 
criteria increased by twenty-eight percent and their assets quadrupled to 
more than $4.3 trillion.155  The 2016 report also shows that SRI investing 
continues to expand—now accounting for more than one out of every five 
dollars under professional management.   
Of course, one of the driving forces behind the SRI investment trend 
are millennials.156  One study showed that two-thirds of those aged 22 to 34 
are likely to invest in a company well-known for its social responsibility.157  
Indeed, studies suggest that as the millennial generation gets older, SRI 
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investment will continue to grow as millennial investors are two times as 
likely as the overall investor population to invest in companies targeting 
social or environmental goals.158  “Benefit corps create an attractive 
investment opportunity for the same conscious consumers that have fueled 
organics, fair trade, and “buy local” movements, while enjoying a form of 
inoculation from the short-termism that plagues public equity markets.”159 
This could be a good sign for the benefit corporation movement, 
which will likely be fueled by a younger generation of investors.  Investing 
in a benefit corporation gives impact investors the assurance they need that 
they will be able to hold a company accountable to its mission in the 
future.160 
C.  MARKET DEMAND 
Another form of drive for the social enterprise movement is the 
increase in market demand for these types of companies.  Notably, 
consumer consciousness is on the rise, wielding influence on business like 
never before.161  “In fact, ninety percent of global consumers are likely to 
switch to a brand associated with a good cause.”162  Increasing awareness 
on issues—such as equal pay, environmentally conscious manufacturing 
processes, prevention of counterfeit goods and/or human trafficking, 
responsible farming practices and overproduction of goods—has led to a 
rise in what is known as conscious consumption, a movement of people, 
who seek out ways to make positive decisions about what to buy and look 
for a solution to the negative impact consumerism is having on our 
world.163  A survey done by YouGov and the Global Poverty Project, 
concluded that “three-quarters of consumers would pay an extra five 
percent for clothes manufactured under fair and safe working conditions”, 
while a Nielsen survey found that “a global majority would be willing to 
pay more for products or services provided by companies that are 
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committed to positive social and environmental impact.”164  In the latter 
group, millennials comprised fifty-one percent of sampling.165  Indeed, 
millennials may be a huge driving force behind the social enterprise 
movement in the future.  “If you look at the millennials’ point of view, they 
want to know the company behind a brand, its values, and what it does for 
society and the community.”166 
Accelerating consumer demand has resulted in the formation of a 
substantial marketplace for companies that are using the power of business 
to solve social problems.167  It is likely that this increased consumer 
consciousness will be a substantial driving force behind the benefit 
corporation movement.  Thus, businesses should seek to take advantage of 
this market of conscious consumers who no longer hold traditional utility 
preferences, as the public and millennials, in particular, continue to drive 
and demand social entrepreneurship. 
D.  HOW CAN WE DO MORE 
As suggested above, market and investor support is necessary to 
continue the growth of the benefit corporation movement.  At a macro 
level, local and federal government backing could provide the boost to 
social entrepreneurs, investors, and to consumers to grow the movement 
fully.  That is to say that if we, as a society, value corporations that provide 
a social benefit or good in a sustainable way, it may be necessary to invest 
in infrastructure to support them. 
i.  Government Support 
There are three methods in which the government may provide 
support to the benefit corporation movement.  There is little research done 
on the potential success of these methods, therefore this note will only be 
able to hypothesize the realities of implementing them. 
First, in order to attract more entrepreneurs to the benefit corporation, 
the government could provide tax breaks to these businesses.  Providing 
financial support may help social enterprises that are struggling to make a 
profit succeed.  However, academics have argued that extending non-profit 
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type tax benefits to social enterprises could threaten the very benefits that 
their creators sough to create, as well as having a deleterious effect on the 
charitable sector itself.168  A forgiving tax structure, they argue, may “place 
a substantial and likely unsustainable burden on the federal government to 
ensure that profitmaking does not trump providing public benefit, and 
threaten to undermine public support both for hybrid forms and for the 
existing tax preferences enjoyed by nonprofits.”169   
However, with additional reporting and transparency requirements, 
providing tax breaks for public benefit corporations could serve as a 
substantial catalyst for the creation of more socially-motivated entities.  
Nevertheless, to be effective the enforcement mechanisms will need to be 
more stringent, and greater transparency will be necessary. 
Second, there could be reduced taxes on sustainably sourced and 
manufactured goods proposed both on a local or state level.  This effort 
would attempt to influence market consumers to into buying these goods.  
A reduced sales tax on goods which are manufactured in a sustainable way 
or by a certified B Corp may help to supplement these enterprises and to 
ensure their financial growth.  This can be seen as a direct opposite 
approach to what is called a “sin” tax,170 in which the government taxes 
‘bad behaviors’ to deter consumers from engaging in them.  For instance, 
the government places higher taxes on goods and behaviors which they do 
not want to support and want to sway consumers away from buying, such 
as on cigarettes.  Therefore, what is to say that the government should not 
be decreasing taxes on goods that provide a social benefit or are produced 
in a sustainable way.  This is completely hypothetical, but in an ideal world 
could be used to increase the purchasing of goods from companies that are 
incorporated as public benefit corporations. 
Finally, local level governments can provide greater support to benefit 
corporations.  This is being done in some cities in the form of awarding city 
contracts to benefit corporations.  For example, the cities of Philadelphia 
and San Francisco give preferential treatment to benefit corporations, in 
hiring these benefit corporations for various city project contracts.171   
While arguably the first two proposals are somewhat lofty and could 
result in an uphill political battle, at the very least local governments could 
provide support for benefit corporations. Indeed, if sustainable and socially 
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motivated manufacturing and goods are truly something valued by our 
society, then benefit corporations may be something worth investing in. 
 
VII.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
Lawyers, academics, entrepreneurs, CEOs, and the public at large 
have taken small steps to support the rise of social enterprises.  Following 
global economic crisis and greater demands for corporate responsibility, 
the public support for companies that ‘do good’ is unprecedented.  Today, 
corporations can be designed in a way to create profit while also 
maintaining a public benefit and doing so in a sustainable way.  Through 
the establishment of the benefit corporation, it has now became a reality for 
corporations to be able to support constituencies other than their 
shareholders.  Indeed, benefit corporations “have the potential to change 
the accountability structure within which managers operate by creating 
incremental reform that puts actual power behind the idea that corporations 
should do the right thing.”172   
When the benefit corporation statute was passed in California in 2012, 
Patagonia’s founder stated, “I hope five or ten years from now, we’ll look 
back on this day and say this was the start of a revolution, because the 
existing paradigm isn’t working anymore.  This is the future.”173  Now that 
it’s been nearly seven years, it is safe to say that this vision has advanced, 
with the spread of social enterprise and the creation of the benefit 
corporation statute in half of the fifty states.  However, the movement has 
not yet garnered the support necessary to make a real impact on society. 
Indeed, only time will tell whether the benefit corporation will be strong 
enough to sustain itself and prove to be a replacement the traditional 
corporate model.   
Nevertheless, the benefit corporation model shows  true promise for the 
future of business leaders and investors, as it provides an alternative to the 
traditional corporate and business profit-seeking model.  In an ideal world, 
through the influence of social enterprise and the market demand by 
conscious consumers, all corporations will be designed to fulfill a public 
good, to promote sustainability, and to create a fair and just economy.  
However, until that point, the benefit corporation can serve to support social 
enterprises and the growth of socially conscious business practices, which 
can provide for a more sustainable and efficient society. 
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